In State v. Dowdell, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that other acts evidence which is otherwise relevant to show a defendant's sexual deviance may still be excluded where the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.
The defendant was charged with the forcible rape of a 28 year-old woman. In an attempt to show the defendant’s propensity to commit acts of sexual assault, the State moved to introduce evidence of two prior incidents involving the defendant which occurred over a decade earlier. The two prior incidents occurred when the defendant was around 18 and 19 years old and involved (apparently consensual) sexual acts with two 13 year-old girls. He was initially charged with child molestation for these incidents but ultimately pleaded guilty to the reduced charges of sexual battery and simple battery.
The trial court agreed with the State that these other acts were relevant to show that the defendant had previously engaged in sexually deviant behavior, but disagreed that the acts were probative of the defendant’s motive and intent in the present case. Instead, the court found that the only real probative value of the extraneous acts was to show the defendant’s lustful disposition.
Turning next to the prejudicial nature of such evidence, the trial court feared that if a jury heard evidence of these prior acts, the defendant might be convicted based on his character as opposed to the evidence in the present case.
As a result of this balancing test, the trial court excluded the other act evidence and the State appealed, arguing that the court applied the wrong legal standard. Specifically, the State argued that excluding relevant evidence as prejudicial is an extraordinary measure, and that the court did not take into account the prosecutorial need for the evidence in this case.
The Court of Appeals rejected the State’s arguments. The hearing transcripts revealed that the trial court was aware that exclusion is an extraordinary measure and properly balanced the competing interests. The Court recognized that even if the trial court had expressly determined that the prior acts evidence met all the requirements for admission under either OCGA §§ 24-4-404 (b) or 24-4-413, the court still had the discretion to exclude it pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-403.
As to the State’s last argument, the Court noted that the trial court was well aware of the prosecutorial need for the evidence but simply disagreed as to its probative value. The Court explained that the probative value of extrinsic evidence is lessened where the prior offenses are not particularly similar to the charged offense, and where a significant amount of time has passed between the prior and current offense.
Since the prior acts at issue here occurred over ten years ago, and were not particularly similar, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling and held that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude this otherwise relevant evidence on the grounds that it was overly prejudicial to the defendant.
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