Appeals Court Reverses Exclusion of Other Act Evidence in Rape Case

In State v. Chowdhury, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling that evidence of one rape allegation against the defendant would not be admissible at the trial on a separate rape allegation. However, the court did affirm a separate ruling that excluded evidence regarding the defendant’s prior conviction for sexual battery.

Background

The defendant was accused of rape and sodomy by two different women. The allegations were both made in 2021, and both involved women who the defendant met on a dating app. The defendant contended that both sexual encounters were consensual.

The first allegation was made in March 2021. The detective investigating the allegation determined that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute.

The second allegation was then made in December 2021. Following this, the detective proceeded to obtain arrest warrants for both allegations.

The defendant was later indicted in two separate indictments – one for each allegation. In each case, the State sought to introduce evidence of the other allegation. The State also sought to introduce evidence of a prior sexual battery conviction based on an incident from 2014 where the defendant grabbed a woman’s butt at a store where he was working.

Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court ruled that none of the other act evidence would be admissible. It concluded that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the risk of prejudice to the defendant. It found that the evidence would potentially be misleading to the jury and could lead to confusion of the issues at trial.

The ruling was based in part on the court’s inference that the detective’s initial decision not to prosecute the March 2021 allegation was because it was believed that the evidence was not strong. Therefore, it held that the State was essentially trying to bolster a weak case by “piling on” bad character evidence. The trial court’s fear was that this could lead to a conviction based more on the defendant’s perceived character than on the actual evidence of the charged offense.

Standard for Admission of Other Act Evidence

The rules for the admission of other act evidence in sex offense cases are much more liberal than in any other type of criminal case.

Rule 413 provides that in any case involving an alleged sexual assault, evidence of another alleged sexual assault is admissible and may be considered for any reason whatsoever. The Georgia appellate courts have held that Rule 413 is “a rule of inclusion, with a strong presumption in favor of admissibility.”

This is much different than Rule 404, which limits this type of evidence in other criminal cases and also limits the reasons for which it may be used. While Rule 404 has a strict prohibition against using other act evidence to prove a defendant’s propensity to commit the crime, evidence under Rule 413 can be used to prove that a defendant has a “lustful disposition” or a propensity to commit sex crimes.

The only basis for excluding evidence that would otherwise be admissible under Rule 413 is if it violates the balancing test in Rule 403.

Under Rule 403, evidence that is relevant and admissible may be excluded if the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of causing unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or undue delay.

Rule 403 is viewed by our appellate courts as “an extraordinary remedy” that should be used only sparingly, especially when being used to exclude evidence under Rule 413.

Court of Appeals’ Analysis

The Court of Appeals held that the exclusion of the other rape allegation was erroneous as it was highly probative of the issue of consent. The Court pointed out that, without it, the only other evidence on consent would be the woman’s word versus the defendant’s.

Plus, the similarity between the two allegations was found to be another significant factor. Both women met the defendant on a dating app, both claimed that the defendant used their interest in music as a pretense for inviting them over to his home. The encounters similarly involved both vaginal and anal sex. Lastly, both incidents occurred within the same year.

The Court found that the similarities and relative proximity of the two allegations reduced the potential risk of prejudice to the defendant or confusing the jury.

However, the Court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s prior sexual battery conviction. It held that the nature of that conduct was quite different and occurred seven years prior to the incidents in the present case. As a result, the Court found that there was no basis to disturb that ruling.